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THE ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT
RETENTION SYSTEM ATE MY HOMEWORK:
GROSS NEGLIGENCE AND THE
REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION OF
PREJUDICE WITHIN THE DOCTRINE OF
SPOLIATION IN FEDERAL COURTS
TRISTAN EVANS-WILENTt
INTRODUCTION
Mankind's ability to record and store information was
dramatically increased by the advent of electronically stored
information ("ESI"). Presently, roughly ninety-two percent of
newly created information is stored electronically.' Moreover, the
ways in which we communicate information are increasingly
electronic: Over one hundred billion emails are sent each day
and less than one-third of all electronic documents are ever
printed.2 Every year the world produces electronic information
that is equal to three million times the amount of information
stored in every book ever written.' Furthermore, the amount of
ESI will continue to multiply at an exponential rate as
computing powers continue to expand and evolve.4
t Senior Staff Member, St. John's Law Review; J.D., 2013, St. John's University
School of Law. I am indebted to Lee Adlerstein for introducing me to the problems
that ESI poses to the doctrine of spoliation. I would also like to thank Professor
Peggy McGuinness for her insightful comments and suggestions.
I ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. JOINT COMM. ON ELEC. DISCOVERY,
EXPLOSION OF ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY IN ALL AREAS OF LITIGATION NECESSITATES
CHANGES IN CPLR 1 (2009).
2 THE RADICATI GROUP, INC., EMAIL STATISTICS REPORT, 2013-2017, at 3
(2013), available at http://www.radicati.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Email-
Statistics-Report-2013-2017-Executive-Summary.pdf.
3 JOHN F. GANTZ ET AL., INT'L DATA CORP., THE EXPANDING DIGITAL UNIVERSE:
A FORECAST OF WORLDWIDE INFORMATION GROWTH THROUGH 2010, at 1
(2007), available at http://www.emc.com/collateral/analyst-reports/expanding-digital-
idc-white-paper.pdf.
C Of. In re United States' Application for a Search Warrant To Seize & Search
Elec. Devices from Edward Cunnius, 770 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1144 (W.D. Wash. 2011)
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While ESI has given litigants unheralded access to
information, it has also placed a large financial burden on the
discovery process. Litigants are obligated to preserve electronic
information under both state and federal rules.' Preserving ESI
is not as straightforward as the duty to preserve hardcopies:
Electronic information is created at a breakneck speed, so much
so that even the most powerful ESI systems cannot retain all of
the electronic information that is produced. Consequently, ESI
systems use retention protocols that actively destroy electronic
information. Once an ESI retention protocol is set in motion, a
company may need to take complicated steps to prevent the
routine destruction of information. The cost of stopping an ESI
retention protocol increases the already high economic burdens of
discovery.' Litigants may need to hire IT specialists to assist
them in stopping the routine destruction of ESI. Disabling a
litigant's ESI retention protocol increases the amount of ESI it
stores and may create the need to purchase storage space to hold
the excess information.
Litigants' duty to preserve ESI has also increased the
amount of sanctions issued as a result of the spoliation of
electronic information. The increase in spoliation sanctions
(quoting David A. Couillard, Note, Defogging the Cloud: Applying Fourth
Amendment Principles to Evolving Privacy Expectations in Cloud Computing, 93
MINN. L. REV. 2205, 2216 (2009)) (discussing a new way to store information called
" 'cloud computing'" that "'allows individuals and businesses to collaborate on
documents, spreadsheets, and more, even when the collaborators are in remote
locations' ").
s See, e.g., Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am.
Sec., LLC, 685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), abrogated by Chin v. Port Auth.
of N.Y. & N.J., 685 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2012); Voom HD Holdings LLC v. EchoStar
Satellite L.L.C., 93 A.D.3d 33, 44, 939 N.Y.S.2d 321, 330 (1st Dep't 2012).
6 See AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM.
LEGAL SYS., INTERIM REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF
TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE INSTITUTE FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 3 (2008) (internal quotation marks
omitted), available at http://www.actl.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=AllPublic
ations&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentlD=3650 ("Discovery costs far
too much and has become an end in itself.. . . The discovery rules in particular are
impractical in that they promote full discovery as a value above almost everything
else. Electronic discovery, in particular, clearly needs a serious overhaul.").
' See Dan H. Willoughby, Jr. et al., Sanctions for E-Discovery Violations: By the
Numbers, 60 DUKE L.J. 789, 790-91 (2010) ("E-discovery sanctions are at an all-time
high. We identified 230 sanction awards in 401 cases involving motions for sanctions
relating to the discovery of electronically stored information (ESI) in federal courts
prior to January 1, 2010. ... Our analysis indicates that although the annual
1194 [Vol. 87:1193
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raises litigation costs and puts additional stress on crowded
dockets. Federal courts have struggled to deal with the increase
in spoliation sanctions and have adopted conflicting standards
when issuing spoliation sanctions.
Generally, a party moving for spoliation sanctions in a
federal court has the burden of showing that (1) the spoliating
party had a duty to preserve the information; (2) the party failed
to preserve the information with a culpable mens rea; and (3) the
destroyed information would have been prejudicial to the
spoliating party's claim had it not been destroyed.'
The third element of the test is the hardest burden to meet.
It is difficult for the non-spoliating party to comment on the
subject matter of information when that information has been
destroyed. Given that difficulty, federal courts have provided an
escape hatch: Courts will presume the prejudicial nature of the
destroyed evidence when the spoliating party acted intentionally
or in bad faith.' This presumption shifts the burden to the
spoliating party, which now has to prove that the destroyed
information was not prejudicial to its claim. The rebuttable
presumption of prejudice is often triggered when federal courts
deal with hardcopies, for the simple reason that it is difficult to
unintentionally shred a hard document. In the context of
electronic information, however, federal courts are less likely to
find a rebuttable presumption of prejudice because electronic
information is often destroyed automatically via automated
document purging.'0
The ease with which electronic information can be
unintentionally destroyed has two effects. First, it makes it
harder to prove that a spoliating party who deletes electronic
information did so with intent or bad faith. Second, because it is
difficult to show the required intent or bad faith necessary to
number of e-discovery sanction cases is generally increasing, there has been a
significant increase in both motions and awards since 2004.").
8 See Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 107 (2d
Cir. 2002).
9 See Consol. Aluminum Corp. v. Alcoa, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 335, 340 n.6 (M.D. La.
2006).
10 Michael R. Nelson & Mark H. Rosenberg, A Duty Everlasting: The Perils of
Applying Traditional Doctrines of Spoliation to Electronic Discovery, 12 RICH. J.L. &
TECH. 1, 3 (2006) (discussing the fact that corporations commonly adopt document
retention policies in which ESI "is routinely deleted from a business' 'active'
computer system").
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trigger the presumption of prejudice in satisfaction of the third
prong of the test, the non-spoliating party shoulders the burden
of proving that the spoliated information was actually prejudicial
to the spoliating party. To ease this burden, some courts have
begun allowing gross negligence to trigger a rebuttable
presumption that the unintentionally destroyed evidence was
prejudicial to the spoliating party."
This Note argues against imposing such a rebuttable
presumption where the spoliating party acted with gross
negligence. Part I provides a general background of the doctrine
of spoliation and its application to electronic information. Part II
examines the three different approaches taken by the federal
circuits to whether gross negligence should trigger a rebuttable
presumption that the spoliated evidence was prejudicial to the
spoliating party. Finally, Part III argues that courts should not
allow gross negligence to trigger a rebuttable presumption that
the spoliated evidence was prejudicial to the spoliating party.
I. A GENERAL BACKGROUND OF THE DOCTRINE OF SPOLIATION
AND ITS APPLICATION TO ELECTRONIC INFORMATION
Part I of this Note provides a general background of the
doctrine of spoliation and its application to electronic
information. First, Section A discusses the source of federal
courts' power to issue spoliation sanctions. Section B then
introduces the test federal courts use to decide whether to issue
spoliation sanctions. Then, Section C analyzes the three
rationales federal courts use for issuing spoliation sanctions.
Finally, Section D provides an overview of the kinds of spoliation
sanctions federal courts issue.
A. Federal Courts' Authority To Grant Spoliation Sanctions
The doctrine of spoliation refers to "the destruction or
material alteration of evidence or to the failure to preserve
property for another's use as evidence in pending or reasonably
foreseeable litigation." 12 English courts have imposed sanctions
" See Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am.
Sec., LLC, 685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 467-68 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), abrogated by Chin v. Port
Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 685 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2012).
12 Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 590 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing West
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999)); Pension Comm.,
685 F. Supp. 2d at 465; accord Cache La Poudre Feeds, LLC v. Land O'Lakes, Inc.,
1196 [Vol. 87:1193
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for spoliation of evidence since the eighteenth century.s In
Armory v. Delamirie, a tortfeasor could not locate a jewel he stole
from the plaintiff.14 As a result, the judge instructed the jury to
presume that the stolen jewel was of the highest quality for the
purposes of measuring damages.'5 Since the early nineteenth
century, American courts embraced the rule embodied in Armory
v. Delamirie."
Today, federal courts' power to issue spoliation sanctions
comes from two sources. First, federal courts possess an inherent
power to sanction parties when carrying out their judicial
duties." The rationale for the inherent power of the courts to
sanction parties comes from the understanding that courts would
be unable to accomplish their judicial responsibilities without
244 F.R.D. 614, 620 (D. Colo. 2007); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1351 (9th ed. 2009);
THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA CONFERENCE GLOSSARY: E-DISCOVERY &
DIGITAL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT 48 (2d ed. 2007).
1s See, e.g., Armory v. Delamirie, (1721) 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (K.B.); see also Welsh
v. United States, 884 F.2d 1239, 1246 (6th Cir. 1988) ("That an adverse presumption
may arise from the fact of missing evidence is a generally accepted principle of law
that finds its roots in the 18th century.. . . The venerable principle of Armory v.
Delamirie remains good law."), overruled by Adkins v. Wolever, 554 F.3d 650 (6th
Cir. 2009); accord Global Technovations, Inc. v. Onkyo U.S.A. Corp. (In re Global
Technovations, Inc.), 431 B.R. 739, 781 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2010), affd sub nom.
Global Technovations, Inc. v. Global Technovations, Inc. (In re Global
Technovations, Inc.), No. 10-12781, 2011 WL 1297356 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2011),
affd, 694 F.3d 705 (6th Cir. 2012).
14 See Armory, 93 Eng. Rep. at 664.
1 Id. (The judge instructed the jurors that "unless the defendant did produce
the jewel .. . they should presume the strongest against him, and make the value of
the best jewels the measure of their damages . . . .").
16 An early Supreme Court case expresses the rule found in Armory v.
Delamirie:
Concealment, or even spoliation of papers, is not of itself a sufficient
ground for condemnation .... But it is a circumstance open to
explanation ... and if the party in the first instance fairly and frankly
explains it to the satisfaction of the court, it deprives him of no right to
which he is otherwise entitled. If, on the other hand, the spoliation be
unexplained, or the explanation appear weak and futile . .. condemnation
ensues from defects in the evidence which the party is not permitted to
supply.
The Pizarro, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 227, 241 (1817).
17 See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44-45 (1991) (holding that courts
have an inherent power "to fashion an appropriate sanction for conduct which
abuses the judicial process"); Leon v. IDX Sys. Corp., 464 F.3d 951, 958 (9th Cir.
2006).
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such a power.18  For instance, without the power to issue
sanctions for the destruction of evidence, courts could not ensure
adequate compliance with procedural discovery rules.
In addition to courts' inherent power to issue sanctions for
spoliation, they may also issue spoliation sanctions under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Under Rule 37, a court may
issue sanctions for spoliation when a party "fails to obey [a court]
order to provide or permit discovery."20 Though the federal
courts' inherent power to issue sanctions is broader than their
power to issue sanctions under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the latter power gives federal courts more definitive
guidelines for issuing sanctions.
While the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have given courts
authority to grant sanctions for spoliation since 1937,21 the Rules
were recently amended to address the spoliation doctrine in the
context of ESI. In 2006, the Judicial Conference Committee on
the Rules of Practice and Procedure adopted Rule 37(e) to
designate when parties should be sanctioned for the spoliation of
electronic information: "Absent exceptional circumstances, a
court may not impose sanctions under these rules on a party for
failing to provide electronically stored information lost as a result
of the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information
system."2 2 Despite its purpose, Rule 37 failed to create a bright-
line rule for the imposition of sanctions, leading to divergent
results and subsequent confusion.23
The main debate concerning the application of Rule 37(e)
depends on the interpretation of the term "good faith." Rule
37(e)'s "good faith" requirement does not specify the mens rea
sufficient to trigger sanctions and makes no effort to define good
faith.24 Under Rule 37, it is unclear whether the "good faith"
requirement encompasses negligent actions that result in the
destruction of electronic information. Indeed, the drafting
1 See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 43.
19 FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b).
20 Leon, 464 F.3d at 958 (quoting Fjelstad v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 762 F.2d
1334, 1337-38 (9th Cir. 1985)).
21 See FED. R. CIV. P. 37.
22 Id. at 37(e).
23 Alexander B. Hastings, Note, A Solution to the Spoliation Chaos: Rule 37(e)'s
Unfulfilled Potential To Bring Uniformity to Electronic Spoliation Disputes, 79 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 860, 872 (2011).
24 FED. R. CIv. P. 37(e).
1198 [Vol. 87:1193
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history of Rule 37 reveals the Judicial Conference's reluctance to
establish a bright-line rule for issuing spoliation sanctions.25 In a
rejected version of Rule 37, federal courts would have been
barred from issuing sanctions against the spoliating party
"unless the party recklessly or intentionally failed to preserve the
[electronic] information."2 6 The Judicial Conference's decision to
adopt the "good faith" standard in favor of the more discreet
"reckless" standard has triggered a debate about what level of
mens rea is necessary to trigger Rule 37 spoliation sanctions.2 7
Thus, while courts have the power to issue sanctions for the
spoliation of electronic information, the bounds of sanctionable
action are not clear.28
B. The Test for Issuing Spoliation Sanctions
Although there are three distinct rationales for the doctrine
of spoliation, federal courts generally apply the same test for
determining when severe sanctions should be levied as a result of
spoliation.2 9 Under the test, the party moving for sanctions has
the burden of showing that (1) the spoliating party had a duty to
preserve the information; (2) the party failed to preserve the
25 See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE U.S., REPORTS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 86 (2005), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Standin
g/ST2005-01(1).pdf.
26 Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, Adoption &
Amendments to Civil Rules, 234 F.R.D. 219, 244 (2006).
27 See Nicole D. Wright, Note, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e): Spoiling the
Spoliation Doctrine, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 793, 816 (2009) ("The application of Rule
37(e) has resulted in confusion over its meaning.").
21 See id.
29 Most courts tend to distinguish between spoliation sanctions such as fines
and those that have an adverse impact on one of the parties to the litigation. For
example, in Pension Committee of the University of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of
America Securities, the judge stated that the proof required for the court to issue
sanctions hinged on the severity of the sanction:
The burden of proof question differs depending on the severity of the
sanction. For less severe sanctions-such as fines and cost-shifting-the
inquiry focuses more on the conduct of the spoliating party than on
whether documents were lost.. . . [F]or more severe sanctions ... the court
must consider, in addition . .. whether any missing evidence was relevant
and whether the innocent party has suffered prejudice as a result of the
loss of evidence.
685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), abrogated by Chin v. Port Auth. of N.Y. &
N.J., 685 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2012).
2013]1 1199
ST. JOHNS LAW REVIEW
information with a culpable mens rea; and (3) the destroyed
information would have been prejudicial to the spoliating party's
claim had it not been destroyed."
The first element requires the court to consider whether the
spoliating party had a duty to preserve the information in
question. Federal courts generally agree that a party has a duty
to preserve evidence within its control once it "reasonably
anticipates litigation."3  While there is a debate among federal
courts about when a party should reasonably anticipate
litigation, this Note will not address that topic. 32 Nonetheless, so
long as a party should not have reasonably anticipated litigation,
and there is no explicit statutory requirement governing the type
of document at issue, the party has no affirmative duty to retain
information. 34 For example, a corporation may destroy ESI in its
possession, so long as the ESI is not connected to any litigation
the corporation should reasonably anticipate and there is no
statutory duty that imposes an explicit duty to retain the
information.
30 See, e.g., Residential Funding Corp., v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 107
(2d Cir. 2002) (stating the three part test for determining if sanctions should be
issued under the doctrine of spoliation). Some circuits also include an additional
factor in the analysis, which considers "whether there is a lesser sanction that will
avoid substantial unfairness to the opposing party and, where the offending party is
seriously at fault, will serve to deter such conduct by others in the future." Schmid v.
Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp., 13 F.3d 76, 79 (3d Cir. 1994).
31 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); accord
Fujitsu Ltd. v. Fed. Express Corp., 247 F.3d 423, 436 (2d Cir. 2001) ("The obligation
to preserve evidence arises when the party has notice that the evidence is relevant
to litigation or when a party should have known that the evidence may be relevant
to future litigation.").
32 Compare Broccoli v. Echostar Commc'ns Corp., 229 F.R.D. 506, 511 (D. Md.
2005) (holding that defendant's preservation duty was triggered when plaintiff first
complained about sexual harassment to his supervisor), with Treppel v. Biovail
Corp., 233 F.R.D. 363, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding that defendant's duty to
preserve evidence did not arise until defendant became aware that the complaint
had been filed).
3 For example, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1020 obligates certain parties to preserve
medical records absent reasonably foreseeable litigation. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1020
(2012).
" See Zubulake, 220 F.R.D. at 216-17.
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Under the second part of the test, the court considers
whether the spoliating party acted with the requisite mens rea.
In attempting to interpret Rule 37(e), some courts define the
requisite mens rea as negligence,as while others require a
showing of bad faith."
Finally, under the third part of the test, the court looks to
the injury done to the non-spoliating party.37 As stated in
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, the third element asks whether
"the destroyed evidence was relevant to the party's claim or
defense such that a reasonable trier of fact could find that it
would support that claim or defense."3 To determine whether
the destroyed evidence was relevant and prejudicial, the court
requires the party moving for sanctions to show that the
destroyed evidence (1) was relevant to the lawsuit and (2) would
have been prejudicial to the spoliating party's claim had it not
been destroyed. In effect, the court requires the party moving
for spoliation sanctions to show the damages that resulted from
the spoliation.40 By requiring a showing of damages, courts
provide a check against unfounded spoliation claims and the
35 See Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am.
Sec., LLC, 685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (explaining that a party's
conduct of discovery is unacceptable when it is "negligent, grossly negligent, or
willful."), abrogated by Chin v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 685 F.3d 135 (2d Cir.
2012).
36 See, e.g., Rimkus Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598,
614 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (stating that courts in the Fifth Circuit will not grant severe
sanctions unless there is evidence that the spoliating party acted in bad faith).
3 See Zubulake, 220 F.R.D. at 220.
1 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
9 See Consol. Aluminum Corp. v. Alcoa, Inc. 244 F.R.D. 335, 346 (M.D. La.
2006) (citing Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., No. LR-C-95-781, 1997 WL
33352759, at *7 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 29, 1997)) (holding that the relevance and prejudice
factor of the spoliation test can be broken down to three sub-factors: "(1) whether the
evidence is relevant to the lawsuit; (2) whether the evidence would have supported
the inference sought; and (3) whether the non-destroying party has suffered
prejudice from the destruction of the evidence"); accord Rimkus, 688 F. Supp. 2d at
616.
40 See Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 108-09
(2d Cir. 2002); Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 467 ("The innocent party must
also show that the evidence would have been helpful in proving its claims or
defenses-i.e., that the innocent party is prejudiced without that evidence. Proof of
relevance does not necessarily equal proof of prejudice."); Rimkus, 688 F. Supp. 2d at
616-17.
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resulting motions for sanctions.' Without demanding a showing
of damages, litigants could use spoliation sanctions as a sword
instead of a shield.42
C. Rationales for Spoliation Sanctions
The three-part test that federal courts generally use to
decide when to issue spoliation sanctions reflects each of the
rationales for levying spoliation sanctions: punishment,
deterrence, and remediation.4 3
The federal courts' first rationale for issuing spoliation
sanctions is punishment. The punishment rationale operates
under the belief that sanctions should be levied against a
spoliating party in order to punish the spoliater for his or her
behavior.44 Under the punishment rationale, federal courts focus
on the behavior of the spoliating party-quantified by the mens
rea of the spoliating party and the prejudice caused by the
spoliation.45
The federal courts' second rationale for issuing spoliation
sanctions is deterrence.4 6 Under the deterrent rationale, courts
use the threat of sanctions to deter parties from destroying
evidence. 47  Like the punitive rationale, the deterrent rationale
focuses on the behavior of the spoliating party, using the mens
rea of the spoliating party and the prejudice caused by the
spoliation to measure such behavior.4 8
41 See Rimkus, 688 F. Supp. 2d at 616 ("Courts recognize that a showing that
the lost information is relevant and prejudicial is an important check on spoliation
allegations and sanctions motions.").
42 See id.
4 See West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999)
(stating that sanctions "should be molded to serve the prophylactic, punitive, and
remedial rationales underlying the spoliation doctrine").
" See Nat'l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643
(1976) (stating that sanctions should be issued to "penalize those whose conduct may
be deemed to warrant such a sanction").
4 See id.
46 See id. (stating that sanctions should be issued "to deter those who might be
tempted to such conduct in the absence of such a deterrent"); Update Art, Inc. v.
Modiin Publ'g, Ltd., 843 F.2d 67, 71 (2d Cir. 1988) (stating that spoliation sanctions
are "specific deterrents").




The federal courts' third rationale for issuing spoliation
sanctions is remedial.49 The remedial rationale acts to restore
the injured party to "the same position he would have been in
absent the wrongful destruction of evidence by
the ... [spoliating] party."so Unlike the punitive and deterrent
rationales, which focus on the behavior of the spoliating party,
the remedial rationale focuses on the injured party.5' The
remedial rationale measures the injury by looking to the
prejudice caused by the spoliation but also uses the mens rea of
the spoliating party to quantify the prejudice.52
The first element of the spoliation test requires that the
party moving for sanctions show that the spoliating party had a
duty to preserve the destroyed information.53 By requiring this,
courts ensure that a party that did not breach a legal duty to
preserve evidence is not punished. Similarly, under the
deterrent rationale, a party that did not breach a legal duty to
preserve evidence should not be deterred from acting the same
way in the future. Finally, to further the remedial purpose of
sanctions, a party that did not breach a legal duty to preserve
information should not bear the burden arising from the
destruction of evidence.
The second part of the spoliation test requires that the party
moving for sanctions show that the spoliator acted with the
requisite mens rea.54 The connection between the spoliating
party's mens rea and the court's decision to issue sanctions is
clear when the court's raison d'dtre for sanctions is grounded in
the punitive or deterrent rationale. Under the punitive
rationale, the court focuses on the moral culpability of the
spoliating party in determining the propriety of sanctions.
Under the deterrent rationale, the court looks to the mens rea of
the spoliating party to determine if its actions should be
deterred: If a party did not act with a culpable mens rea, it
should not be deterred from acting the same way in the future.
4 See Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126 (2d Cir. 1998).
so Id.
"' See id.
52 See Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 109 (2d
Cir. 2002).
5 See id. at 107.
54 See id. (requiring that the party destroy the records "with a culpable state of
mind").
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Under the remedial rationale, the court looks at the mens
rea of the spoliating party to help determine whether the
destroyed information was prejudicial. Most federal courts allow
the bad faith or intent of the spoliating party to demonstrate the
prejudicial effect of the spoliation out of a concern that the
burden for moving for spoliation sanctions is too onerous. 5
Courts look to the mens rea of the spoliating party in order to
substantiate whether the spoliated information was prejudicial
because the prejudicial nature of the destroyed evidence may be
hard to prove. For this purpose, the court assumes that the
spoliating party would not destroy evidence intentionally or in
bad faith unless the evidence was prejudicial to the spoliating
party's claim. Thus the spoliation test's mens rea requirement
can act to substantiate the spoliation test's prejudice
requirement. In other words, the test's mens rea requirement
furthers the remedial rationale by acting to quantify the harm
caused by the spoliating party.
The third part of the spoliation test requires that the party
moving for sanctions show that the destroyed information would
have been prejudicial to the spoliating party's claim had it not
been destroyed.56 This requirement ensures consistency with the
punitive rationale by preventing a party that did not cause any
harm through the destruction of evidence from being punished.
Under the deterrent rationale, a party who did not cause any
harm through his or her destruction of evidence should not be
deterred from acting the same way in the future. Under the
remedial rationale, a party who did not cause any harm through
his or her destruction of evidence has no harm to remediate.
Though the third part of the spoliation test helps guard
against the abuse of the spoliation doctrine, federal courts
acknowledge that the burden of proving that the spoliated
evidence was prejudicial should not be overly demanding.7
Courts realize that the prejudice requirement may be
" See Consol. Aluminum Corp. v. Alcoa, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 335, 340 n.6 (M.D. La.
2006) (stating that bad faith destruction of evidence is "sufficient to demonstrate
relevance").
56 See Residential Funding Corp., 306 F.3d at 107.
a See, e.g., Rimkus Consulting Grp. Inc. v. Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598,
616 (S.D. Tex. 2010); Chan v. Triple 8 Palace, Inc., No. 03CIV6048(GEL)(JCF), 2005
WL 1925579, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2005).
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advantageous to the spoliating party." An innocent party who
moves for sanctions under the doctrine of spoliation may not be
able to obtain evidence that demonstrates the prejudicial nature
of the destroyed information. 9
D. Different Kinds of Spoliation Sanctions
Once a party moving for sanctions under the doctrine of
spoliation has satisfied the three-part test, the court must still
decide which sanctions are appropriate. Courts are empowered
to impose sanctions that assess fees, impose an adverse
inference, preclude the introduction of certain evidence, and act
to enter a default judgment." While federal courts routinely
state that sanctions arising from spoliation must be assessed on
a "case-by-case basis," they still struggle to articulate explicit
guidelines for determining the appropriate sanctions.'
Courts generally divide the range of available sanctions into
two categories. 62  The first category consists of sanctions that
result in monetary fines. Monetary sanctions are generally
levied "to pay the fees incurred by the party that moved for
sanctions," and to "shift costs to a party responsible for wasted
discovery efforts or supplemental discovery." While monetary
sanctions hurt a litigant's pocketbook, they have no material
impact on the adjudication of the claim at issue.
The second class is composed of sanctions that have a
material impact on the adjudication of the claim. For instance,
an adverse inference sanction gives the jury the option to assume
that the spoliated information would have been unfavorable to
the spoliating party.' The adverse inference sanction has a
58 See Triple 8 Palace, 2005 WL 1925579, at *7 (discussing that the burden
placed on the party moving for sanctions under the spoliation doctrine "ought not be
too onerous, lest the spoliator be permitted to profit from its destruction").
59 See id.
60 See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(A) (listing the various sanctions courts can impose
for the spoliation of evidence).
6" See Fujitsu Ltd. v. Fed. Express Corp., 247 F.3d 423, 436 (2d Cir. 2001).
62 See Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am.
Sec., LLC, 685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (distinguishing between two
different classes of sanctions based on their severity), abrogated by Chin v. Port
Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 685 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2012).
6 Hon. John M. Facciola, Hon. Elizabeth D. Laporte, Hon. Lorretta A. Preska &
Hon. Shira A. Scheindlin, Lecture, Panel Discussion, Sanctions in Electronic
Discovery Cases: Views from the Judges, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 5-6 (2009).
6 See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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material effect on the court's adjudication of the claim because it
has the potential to impact the final result of the litigation.6 5
Even though the jury is not forced to make an adverse inference,
but is simply given the option to do so, the effect of an adverse
inference charge generally means that "the party suffering this
[adverse] instruction will be hard-pressed to prevail on the
merits."6
As a general rule, the severity of the sanction imposed on the
spoliating party depends on the degree of harm suffered by the
opposing party.6 7
II. CIRCUIT CouRTs' APPLICATION OF THE SPOLIATION TEST
In dealing with sanctions that have a material impact on the
adjudication of a claim-severe sanctions-courts have struggled
when presented with the issue of whether the grossly negligent
deletion of ESI should be sufficient to trigger the presumption
that the spoliated evidence would have been prejudicial to the
spoliating party if not for its destruction. When presented with
this issue, courts have taken three distinct approaches. Some
circuits hold that severe spoliation sanctions require a mens rea
of bad faith or intent and reject the adoption of a rule that would
allow gross negligence to trigger a presumption that the spoliated
evidence was prejudicial. Other circuits hold that negligence is
sufficient to satisfy the mens rea requirement of spoliation
sanctions but nonetheless reject the adoption of a rule that would
allow gross negligence to trigger a presumption that the spoliated
evidence was prejudicial. Finally, other circuits hold that
negligence is sufficient to satisfy the mens rea requirement of
spoliation sanctions and hold that gross negligence is sufficient to
trigger a presumption that spoliated evidence would have been
prejudicial to the spoliating party if not for its destruction. This
Part examines each approach and the underlying rationales of
the three methods.
* See id. at 219-20.
6 Id.
67 See Stevenson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 354 F.3d 739, 748 (8th Cir. 2004).
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A. No Gross Negligence, Period
The Fourth,8 Fifth," Seventh,70 Eighth,7' Tenth,7 2 and
Eleventh Circuits decline to issue severe spoliation sanctions
where the spoliating party acted with gross negligence.7 3 While
none of these circuits have explicitly held that gross negligence
cannot trigger a presumption of prejudice, it follows as a matter
of course that they would not allow such a presumption.7 4 Since
these circuits do not allow for severe spoliation sanctions when a
spoliator acted with gross negligence,'75 it follows that they do not
allow gross negligence to trigger a presumption of prejudice for
the purposes of issuing spoliation sanctions.
Furthermore, the circuits' rationales for refusing to issue
spoliation sanctions for negligent or grossly negligent spoliation
are premised on a concern over the prejudicial nature of the
destroyed evidence: "[Th]e court must be of the opinion .. . that
the [spoliating] party did so in bad faith. Only then may the
court infer . .. that the contents of the evidence would be
unfavorable to that party if introduced in court. The crucial
element is . . . the reason for the destruction."0
6 See, e.g., Hodge v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 360 F.3d 446, 449-50 (4th Cir.
2004); Vodusek v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 71 F.3d 148, 155-56 (4th Cir. 1995).
69 See, e.g., Condrey v. Suntrust Bank of Georgia, 431 F.3d 191, 203 (5th Cir.
2005) (quoting King v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 337 F.3d 550, 556 (5th Cir. 2003)) ("The Fifth
Circuit permits an adverse inference against the destroyer of evidence only upon a
showing of 'bad faith' or 'bad conduct.' "); Rimkus Consulting Grp., Inc. v.
Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598, 614-15 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (distinguishing the Fifth
Circuit from other circuits that allow for negligence or gross negligence to trigger
sanctions).
70 See, e.g., S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 695 F.2d
253, 258 (7th Cir. 1982).
71 See, e.g., Stevenson, 354 F.3d at 746-47.
72 See, e.g., Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 112 F.3d 1398, 1407 (10th Cir. 1997).
1 See, e.g., Penalty Kick Mgmt. Ltd. v. Coca Cola Co., 318 F.3d 1284, 1294 (11th
Cir. 2003); Bashir v. Amtrak, 119 F.3d 929, 931 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that upper
grade spoliation sanctions, such as an adverse inference charge, will only be drawn
when the destruction of the information was "predicated on bad faith").
74 See supra text accompanying notes 69-73.
75 Id.
76 See S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 695 F.2d at 258; accord Vick v. Tex. Emp't
Comm'n, 514 F.2d 734, 737 (5th Cir. 1975) (internal quotation marks omitted) ("The
adverse inference to be drawn from destruction of records is predicated on bad
conduct of the defendant. Moreover, the circumstances of the act must manifest bad
faith. Mere negligence is not enough, for it does not sustain an inference of
consciousness of a weak case.").
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For example, in the recent case of Rimkus Consulting Group,
Inc. v. Cammarata, two of Rimkus' employees resigned before
immediately forming a competing company named "U.S.
Forensic."77 In response, Rimkus sued the former employees in
the Southern District Court of Texas for breaching
noncompetition and nonsolicitation covenants that the former
employees had signed in their written employment agreements.
In the fall of 2007, during the discovery phase of the
litigation, Rimkus sought information from the defendants,
including email communications between the defendants and
email communications relating to the formation of U.S.
Forensic.79  The defendants initially ignored Rimkus' requests
but eventually delivered sixty emails in the summer of 2009.0
During depositions, U.S. Forensic employees gave conflicting
testimony regarding U.S. Forensic's document retention protocol
but agreed that U.S. Forensic did not suspend the document
retention policy once the instant litigation had began.8 '
Rimkus also obtained additional emails from the defendants'
email and Internet service providers in addition to the sixty
emails that it received from U.S. Forensic. These additional
emails showed that the defendants had "contacted Rimkus
clients . . . to solicit business for U.S. Forensic," a seeming
violation of the nonsolicitation covenant that the defendants had
previously entered into with Rimkus.82
After obtaining the additional emails, Rimkus moved for
severe spoliation sanctions against the defendants.83  Rimkus
alleged that (1) the defendants had a duty to preserve the deleted
emails; (2) the defendants acted in bad faith by intentionally
deleting the emails to conceal unfavorable evidence; and (3) the
deleted emails that Rimkus was unable to recover would have
been prejudicial to the defendants' claim had they not been
destroyed.84
7" 688 F. Supp. 2d 598, 608 (S.D. Tex. 2010).
7 Id.
* Id. at 629.
so Id.
81 Id. at 633.
82 Id. at 633-34 (the court gives specific examples of emails that Rimkus
recovered from defendants' internet and email service providers).




The district court held that the destroyed email
communications were prejudicial to the defendants' claim.8 ' The
court reasoned that because some of the email communications
that Rimkus had obtained were prejudicial to the defendants'
claim, there was no reason to assume that a portion of the
unrecovered email communications would not be prejudicial to
the defendants' claim.8 6
The court also held that the jury would decide whether the
defendants' deletion of email communications constituted bad
faith spoliation of evidence because the court could not decide as
a matter of law whether the deletion was in bad faith." Under
circuit precedent, if the jury found that the defendants had not
deleted email communications in bad faith, no severe spoliation
sanctions would be issued." On the other hand, if the jury found
that the defendants had deleted email communications in bad
faith, the court would give an adverse inference charge to the
jury.8
In discussing the Fifth Circuit's rationale for forbidding
severe spoliation sanctions without a showing of bad faith
destruction of evidence, the district court stated "that sanctions-
as opposed to other remedial steps-require some degree of
culpability."90 Thus, as evinced by Rimkus, even where destroyed
evidence was found to be prejudicial, the spoliating party will not
suffer severe spoliation sanctions unless the destruction of
evidence was done in bad faith.
85 See id. at 644.
86 See id. at 644-45 ("The evidence of the contents of the deleted emails [that
were recovered] ... shows that deleted and unrecoverable emails . .. were relevant
and that some would have been helpful to Rimkus.").
87 See id. 642-44.
8 Id. at 642.
8 Id.; see supra Part I.D and accompanying notes for a discussion of the adverse
inference charge given as a result of spoliation sanctions.
90 Rimkus, 688 F. Supp. 2d at 613.
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B. Gross Negligence but No Presumption
The First,"' Third,92 Sixth,9" Ninth,94 and D.C. Circuits
generally hold that negligence satisfies the mens rea
requirement for spoliation sanctions95 but nonetheless seem to
" See, e.g., Sacramona v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 106 F.3d 444, 447 (1st Cir.
1997) ("Certainly bad faith is a proper and important consideration in deciding
whether and how to sanction conduct resulting in the destruction of evidence. But
bad faith is not essential.").
92 There is some disagreement within the Third Circuit about whether a finding
of bad faith spoliation is necessary to issue severe spoliation sanctions. Compare
Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 334 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that
severe spoliation sanctions should be issued "only when the spoliation or destruction
[of evidence] was intentional, and indicates fraud and a desire to suppress the truth,
and it does not arise where the destruction was a matter of routine with no
fraudulent intent"), and Gumbs v. Int'l Harvester, Inc., 718 F.2d 88, 96 (3d Cir.
1983) (holding that bad faith can trigger spoliation sanctions), with Mosaid Techs.
Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., 348 F. Supp. 2d 332, 337-38 (D.N.J. 2004) ("As long
as there is some showing that the evidence is relevant . .. the offending party's
culpability is largely irrelevant as it cannot be denied that the opposing party has
been prejudiced."). See also Lauren R. Nichols, Note, Spare the Rod, Spoil the
Litigator? The Varying Degrees of Culpability Required for an Adverse Inference
Sanction Regarding Spoliation of Electronic Discovery, 99 KY. L.J. 881, 891-92
(2011) (discussing recent holdings within the Third Circuit that suggest negligence
satisfies the mens rea requirement for issuing spoliation sanctions).
9 The Sixth Circuit is split regarding the mens rea necessary to allow for severe
spoliation sanctions. Compare BancorpSouth Bank v. Herter, 643 F. Supp. 2d 1041,
1062 (W.D. Tenn. 2009) ("[A] finding [ofJ bad faith or intentional misconduct is not
necessary, [but] the more culpable the state of mind, the easier it is for the party
seeking the spoliation sanction to establish the third element-relevance."), and
Forest Labs., Inc. v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd., No. 06-CV-13143, 2009 WL 998402,
at *5 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 14, 2009) (holding that ordinary negligence satisfies the
culpability requirement for spoliation sanctions), with In re Nat'l Century Fin.
Enters., Inc., Fin. Inv. Litig., No. 2:03-md-1565, 2009 WL 2169174, at *3 (S.D. Ohio,
July 16, 2009) ("Generally, a court will not impose an adverse inference with respect
to destroyed evidence, unless the party did so in bad faith.").
9' See, e.g., Glover v. BIC Corp., 6 F.3d 1318, 1329 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that
a spoliater's bad faith "is not a prerequisite" for a sanction that levies an adverse
inference charge to the jury). While the Ninth Circuit has stated that bad faith is not
necessary to trigger severe spoliation sanctions, it has not yet held whether
negligence alone is sufficient to satisfy the mens rea requirement for severe
spoliation sanctions. Id. But some district courts within the Ninth Circuit have
suggested that negligence alone is a sufficient mens rea for the court to issue
sanctions. Surowiec v. Capital Title Agency, 790 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1008 (D. Ariz.
2011) (citing Melendres v. Arpaio, No. Cv-07-2513-PHX-GMS, 2010 WL 582189, at
*5 (D. Ariz. Feb. 12, 2010)).
9 The D.C. Circuit has no definitive rule regarding whether negligence is
sufficient to satisfy the mens rea requirement for spoliation sanctions. However,
courts have stated that negligence fulfills the mens rea requirement for issuing
spoliation sanctions. See, e.g., D'Onofrio v. SFX Sports Grp., Inc., No. 06-687
(JDB/JMF), 2010 WL 3324964, at *6 (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 2010).
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reject the adoption of a rule allowing gross negligence to trigger a
presumption that the spoliated evidence was prejudicial.
These circuits' rationale for allowing negligence to satisfy the
mens rea requirement for issuing spoliation sanctions rests on
the opinion that the primary element of the spoliation test is the
prejudicial requirement: "As long as there is some showing that
the evidence is relevant, .. . the offending party's culpability is
largely irrelevant as it cannot be denied that the opposing party
has been prejudiced.""
Moreover, while these circuit courts hold that the bad faith
destruction of evidence may be useful in demonstrating the
prejudicial nature of the destroyed evidence," grossly negligent
destruction of evidence does not provide for the same inference.
These circuits only allow for the negligent destruction of evidence
to trigger sanctions where "the other side is prejudiced" as a
result of the destruction.
For example, in D'Onofrio v. SFX Sports Group, Inc.,99
plaintiff D'Onfrio filed a discrimination suit against her former
employer SFX.0  D'Onfrio alleged that SFX discriminated
against her because she was a woman. 01
During discovery proceedings, D'Onfrio requested SFX to
produce electronic documents related to her claim of sexual
discrimination, such as email communications regarding her
termination.102 SFX first claimed it did not have any electronic
documents in its possession that were responsive to D'Onfrio's
request.'0 Later, SFX notified D'Onfrio that there was a "back-
up e-mail server" that contained information responsive to her
document request.10 4 SFX eventually produced some electronic
' Mosaid Techs. Inc., 348 F. Supp. 2d at 337-38.
91 See, e.g., BancorpSouth Bank, 643 F. Supp. 2d at 1060.
9 Sacramona v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 106 F.3d 444, 447 (1st Cir. 1997);
accord Surowiec, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1007-08 (discussing whether the gross
negligence on the part of the spoliater should trigger a presumption of prejudice and
citing Rimkus for the proposition that gross negligence should not trigger such a
presumption, but not expressly adopting the Rimkus stance on the matter).
I No. 06-687 (JDB/JMF), 2010 WL 3324964, at *1 (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 2010).
100 Id. at *8.
101 Id. at *1.
102 Id. at *1-2.
10 Id. at *1 n.3.
104 Id.
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documents that it culled from the back-up server, but SFX was
unable to recover all of the destroyed electronic documents
requested by the plaintiff.'o
D'Onfiio subsequently moved for spoliation sanctions.'
D'Onfrio alleged that (1) SFX had a duty to preserve her
computer and any electronic documents relevant to her
discrimination claim; (2) SFX destroyed such information in bad
faith; and (3) the destroyed evidence would have been prejudicial
to SFX had it not been destroyed. 0 7
The district court first held that SFX had a duty to preserve
the evidence that D'Onfrio had requested and that SFX had
breached that duty by throwing out D'Onfrio's computer after
SFX had notice of the impending litigation.108 The district court
then held that D'Onfrio had made no attempt to show why SFX
had destroyed the evidence in bad faith.'09 Consequently, the
district court held that D'Onfrio had not shown that SFX's
spoliation was in bad faith and declined to make any inference
regarding the prejudicial nature of the evidence that SFX had
destroyed. 10  The court did not make any presumption of
prejudice based on SFX's negligent destruction of evidence:
When a person purposefully destroys evidence, it is reasonable
to infer that he did so to keep it from being used against
him .... When, as in this case, it is not a party's bad faith that
leads to the destruction of evidence, its actions hardly bespeak
an intention worthy of such a harsh punishment because the
logical premise of the instruction-that the spoliator must have
destroyed the evidence to keep any one from seeing it-is not
there .... [A] court cannot logically infer the intent of what a
party did from its behavior because its behavior was
unthinking-it was negligent and sloppy."
Finally, the district court held that it was unclear whether
D'Onfrio suffered any actual prejudice as a result of SFX's failure
to preserve evidence."'
105 See id. at *3-4.
1" Id. at *4.
107 Id. at *6.
'n Id. at *8.
'" Id. at *9.
no Id. at *10.
nId.
11 Id. at *11.
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As a result of its holding, the district court remanded the
case for an evidentiary hearing in order to ascertain whether the
destroyed evidence was prejudicial.11 3 Specifically, the
evidentiary hearing would address the kind of information that
had been stored on D'Onfrio's computer, the portion of
information that had been found on SFX's back-up servers, and
the nature and evidentiary value of the portion of evidence that
had been found on SFX's back-up server." 4
C. Gross Negligence and the Presumption of Prejudice
While no federal circuit has uniformly held that gross
negligence is sufficient to trigger a presumption that the
destroyed information was prejudicial, some district courts
within the Second Circuit have suggested that gross negligence is
sufficient to trigger the presumption that the spoliated
information was prejudicial. In the widely cited opinion Pension
Committee of the University of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of
America Securities, LLC," Judge Scheindlin of the Southern
District of New York held that negligence may be sufficient to
trigger a presumption that the spoliated information was
prejudicial: "Relevance and prejudice may be presumed when
the spoliating party acted in bad faith or in a grossly negligent
manner .... However, when the spoliating party was merely
negligent, the innocent party must prove both relevance and
prejudice in order to justify the imposition of a severe
sanction." 6
Judge Scheindlin's decision to allow gross negligence to
trigger a rebuttable presumption of prejudice stems from the
court's concern over the burden implicit within the prejudice
requirement.'1 7 By allowing gross negligence to evince prejudice,
113 Id.
" Id. at *11-12.
115 685 F. Supp. 2d 456 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). See generally Rimkus Consulting Grp.,
Inc. v. Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598, 611-20 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (discussing the
Pension Committee opinion in great detail, even though it arose in a completely
different district); Elleanor H. Chin & Ryan D. Derry, Alt-Delete: Judges Have Made
It Clear That Ignorance Is No Longer an Excuse for Spoliation of Electronic
Evidence, 33 LOS ANGELES LAWYER 35 (2010) (commenting on the amount of
attention that Pension Committee attracted).
116 Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 467-68.
n1 Id. at 467-68 (quoting Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp.,
306 F.3d 99, 109 (2d Cir. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted) ("'Courts must
take care not to hold[] the prejudiced party to too strict a standard of proof regarding
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the court circumvents the burden of proving prejudice. While
other courts in the Second Circuit have adopted the same rule,s18
the belief is not uniformly held. 1 9
For example, in Reilly v. Natwest Markets Group Inc., Reilly
sued his employer Natwest Markets for breaching his
employment contract.12 0 After a jury determined that Natwest
had breached Reilly's contract, discovery commenced on the issue
of damages, which included damages arising from quantum
meruit.121
During discovery, Reilly requested that Natwest produce
documents detailing his activities at Natwest. 2 2 After Natwest
responded to the request, Reilly discovered that his "Deal Files"
were not included in Natwest's response.123 Reilly claimed that
the files were important under the theory of quantum meruit
because they showed that Natwest had not paid him for various
transactions.124
Approximately one year later, the presiding judge scheduled
a conference with both parties to discuss Natwest's failure to
preserve the Deal Files and the possibility of issuing an adverse
inference instruction to the jury as a result of Natwest's
failure.125 The day before the conference was scheduled to take
the likely contents of the destroyed [or unavailable] evidence, because doing so
would.. .allow parties who have ... destroyed evidence to profit from that
destruction.' ").
18 See, e.g., Residential Funding Corp., 306 F.3d at 109 ("Accordingly, where a
party seeking an adverse inference adduces evidence that its opponent destroyed
potential evidence (or otherwise rendered it unavailable) in bad faith or through
gross negligence (satisfying the 'culpable state of mind' factor), that same evidence of
the opponent's state of mind will frequently also be sufficient to permit a jury to
conclude that the missing evidence is favorable to the party (satisfying the
'relevance' factor)."); Treppel v. Biovail Corp., 249 F.R.D. 111, 121-22 (S.D.N.Y.
2008) (holding that "under certain circumstances," gross negligence of the spoliating
party will trigger the presumption that the evidence destroyed was prejudicial to the
innocent party); In re NTL, Inc. Sec. Litig., 244 F.R.D 179, 199-200 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(stating that the party seeking an adverse inference sanction need not show that the
destroyed evidence was prejudicial where the spoliating party acted "in bad faith or
through gross negligence").
119 See Orbit One Commc'ns, Inc. v. Numerex Corp., 271 F.R.D. 429, 440
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (discussing how a litigant's failure to show that spoliated
information was prejudicial should not result in sanctions).





125 Id. at 260.
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place, Natwest produced the Deal Files that Reilly had
requested. 2 6 Further inspection of the files revealed, however,
that a substantial portion of the Deal Files was missing from the
production.127 Natwest's reason for the delayed production was
that NatWest had previously looked for the files and had
"stumbled upon [them] yesterday."12 8
The judge held that Natwest had a duty to preserve the Deal
Files and that Natwest's failure to preserve the files amounted to
gross negligence. 12 9 Without referring to the prejudicial nature of
the Deal Files that Natwest had failed to preserve, the judge held
that the jury would be given an adverse inference charge relating
to the subject matter of the lost files.3 o The judge's decision was
affirmed on appeal under the rationale that "[t]rial judges should
have the leeway to tailor sanctions to insure that spoliators do
not benefit from their wrongdoing-a remedial purpose that is
best adjusted according to the facts and evidentiary posture of
each case."' 3 ' Thus, the court's decision in Reilly reflects the
Second Circuit's concern about remedying the harm caused by
the spoliation of evidence. In allowing gross negligence to trigger
a presumption of prejudice, the court eases the burden of proving
prejudice, therefore making it easier for the harm to be cured via
spoliation sanctions.
However, the Second Circuit holds that gross negligence
should only trigger a presumption that the spoliated information
was prejudicial when the spoliator's conduct rises "to the
egregious level" seen in other cases where prejudice was
presumed. 3 2 In effect, the court is saying that gross negligence
will only trigger a presumption that the information was
prejudicial when the spoliating party was particularly grossly
negligent. While courts allowing the gross negligence
presumption have sought to define gross negligence in the
126 Id.
127 See id. at 261.
128 Id. at 260-61.
129 See id. at 261-62.
120 See id. at 261.
" Id. at 267.
132 Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Co., 306 F.3d 99, 109 (2d Cir.
2002).
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context of preserving electronic documents, 3 3 no such attempt
has been made with respect to the extreme gross negligence said
to be necessary to trigger such a presumption.134
III. GROSS NEGLIGENCE AND THE ILL-ADVISED PRESUMPTION OF
PREJUDICE
Part III of this Article argues why the gross negligence of the
spoliating party should not trigger a presumption that the
destroyed evidence was prejudicial to the spoliating party. First,
Section A stresses the need for a clear standard of culpability by
highlighting the unworkability of the gross negligence standard.
Section B then analyzes the adverse costs arising from a
presumption of prejudice triggered by gross negligence. Third,
Section C discusses why the presumption of prejudice triggered
by gross negligence runs contra to the three rationales for
spoliation sanctions. Finally, Section D proposes that the only
way to ensure that sanctions retain their purpose is to amend
Rule 37(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to ensure that
gross negligence cannot trigger a presumption of prejudice.
A. Judicial Administrability
The three-part test that courts routinely use when deciding
whether to issue spoliation sanctions demands that courts
analyze the mens rea of the alleged spoliater. While courts are in
agreement about the importance of the mens rea element, they
have provided little help in defining the different levels of
culpable mens rea in the context of electronic discovery: "While
many treatises and cases routinely define negligence, gross
negligence, and willfulness in the context of tortuous conduct,
[there is] no clear definition of these terms in the context of
discovery misconduct."135
13 See, e.g., Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of
Am. Sec., LLC, 685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 464-65 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (giving specific
examples of actions that amount to gross negligence in the discovery context),
abrogated by Chin v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 685 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2012).
1 See id. at 463 (making no effort to determine what kind of gross negligence
on the part of the spoliating party should trigger a presumption that the spoliated
evidence would have been prejudicial to the spoliating party had it not been for its
destruction).
's" See id. at 463-64.
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In failing to clearly differentiate the different culpability
levels in the context of electronic discovery, courts face a problem
of judicial administrability: If courts are unable to differentiate
between the culpability levels, potential litigants will have little
information to guide their conduct. At the same time, Rule 37(e)
manifests the fact that courts desire some latitude in crafting
spoliation sanctions because what constitutes good faith in one
instance may not in another. While courts' desire to maintain
some amount of discretion when issuing spoliation sanctions is
certainly understandable, granting too much latitude to the
courts serves to obfuscate the adjudication of spoliation
sanctions.
In Pension Committee, Judge Scheindlin asserted that "[tihe
standard of acceptable conduct is determined through experience.
In the discovery context, the standards have been set by years of
judicial decisions."1 36 Thus, a litigant can determine which
actions demonstrate a specific culpability by looking to case
law.13 7 But when litigants take Judge Scheindlin's advice and
look to case law to find definitions for the different culpability
levels of spoliation, they are met with confusion. Even the cases
that Judge Scheindlin cited as examples of grossly negligent
spoliation are less than helpful.3 8
In one case cited by Judge Scheindlin, Adorno v. Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey, the court held that the
defendant's partial attempt to preserve electronic information
was negligent. 3 9 The court premised its finding of negligence on
the fact that the defendant had made some effort to preserve
information, and therefore the defendant's actions did not
amount to gross negligence:
The Port Authority does not dispute that it failed to retain at
least some of the documents at issue here. I am not convinced,
however, that plaintiffs have shown a wholesale failure by the
Port Authority to put in place a litigation hold .. . such that a
finding of gross negligence by defendant would be
appropriate. 140
1a6 Id. at 464.
1s7 See id.
138 See id. at 464-65 n.18 (citing two opinions that provide for conflicting
examples of what constitutes gross negligence).
13 See 258 F.R.D. 217, 228-29 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
140 Id. at 228 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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In another case cited by Judge Scheindlin, Treppel v. Biovail
Corp., the court held that a partial attempt to preserve electronic
information was grossly negligent. 14 1 In Treppel, the court found
that the defendant's failure to preserve certain back-tapes
constituted gross negligence, even though the defendant had
issued a litigation hold on a large portion of information.'42
If a federal court is unable to provide case law that is
consistent in its culpability findings,'14 3 it is unlikely that a
litigant will be up to the task. And since a litigant can only
determine what constitutes gross negligence by looking at case
law,'" a litigant in the Second Circuit has little idea about what
constitutes grossly negligent spoliation.
To compound the problem, courts in the Second Circuit have
held that gross negligence of the spoliating party should only
trigger a presumption of prejudice when the gross negligence is
"egregious."145 But courts within the Second Circuit have not
made any attempt to define what constitutes egregious gross
negligence of a spoliating party.146
Given this lack of clarity, litigants in the Second Circuit have
little to no idea when the grossly negligent spoliation of evidence
will trigger a presumption of prejudice. The seemingly
amorphous nature of such gross negligence will cause
inconsistent adjudication of spoliation sanctions within the
Second Circuit.
141 See 249 F.R.D. 111, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that a party acted with
gross negligence when it preserved some back up tapes, but not all back up tapes).
142 See id.
141 See Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 463.
1 See id.
14 See, e.g., Treppel, 249 F.R.D. at 121-22 (quoting Toussie v. Cnty. of Suffolk,
No. CV 01-6716(JS)(ARL), 2007 WL 4565160, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. April 13, 2007).
"[U]nder certain circumstances 'a showing of gross negligence in the destruction or
untimely production of evidence' will support" a presumption that the destroyed
evidence would have been prejudicial to the spoliating party's claim had it not been
destroyed. Id. (quoting Residential Funding Corp v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d
99, 109 (2d Cir. 2002)).
u4 See, e.g., Residential Funding Corp., 306 F.3d at 109 (holding that gross
negligence of the spoliating party "will in some circumstances suffice" to
demonstrate the prejudicial nature of the destroyed evidence, but failing to provide
guidance about what circumstances of gross negligence will in fact suffice).
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B. The Financial Burdens of Presuming Prejudice
In general, courts have expressed concern about the heavy
burden imposed by the duty to preserve electronic information:
"In an era where vast amounts of electronic information is
available for review, discovery in certain cases has become
increasingly complex and expensive." 4 7 The advent of electronic
information has allowed mankind to retain voluminous amounts
of information. 4 8  Without such electronic storage systems,
parties, specifically businesses, would be physically unable to
retain the same amount of information. While this power of
retention gives parties access to more information, it also exacts
a severe burden when parties have a duty to keep track of and
preserve such a large amount of information.
The Second Circuit's decision to allow the gross negligence of
the spoliating party to trigger a presumption of prejudice when
issuing spoliation sanctions further increases the burden of
preserving electronic information. The court's decision forces
litigants to re-think how they preserve electronic information. It
forces litigants to be even more cautious when preserving
electronic information. This increased burden in turn increases
the cost of doing business. Potential litigants may be forced to
invest in more sophisticated, more expensive document retention
programs in order to allay their fears of spoliation sanctions.
And when litigation does occur, law firms will spend more time
making sure their clients satisfy their preservation duties, which
will in turn cause more billable hours and higher litigation costs.
Furthermore, the sheer amount of ESI dramatically increases the
possibility that information will be lost, regardless of litigants'
efforts to comply with a preservation duty.
The Second Circuit's holding also enhances the bargaining
power of those who might bring fallacious claims.14 The
spoliation test not only deters would-be spoliators from
destroying evidence but also deters litigants from bringing
147 See Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 461-62.
14 See AsS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. JOINT COMM. ON ELEC.
DISCOVERY, supra note 1, at 1.
1 See EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER,
NATIONAL CASE-BASED CIVIL RULES SURVEY 32 (2009) (expressing the fact that




spurious spoliation claims."'o The third part of the test, which
requires the party moving for spoliation to show damages, stops
litigants from bringing "speculative or generalized assertions" of
prejudice stemming from the alleged spoliation."'1 The Second
Circuit's decision to allow gross negligence to trigger a
presumption of prejudice when issuing spoliation sanctions
makes it easier to pass the spoliation test without proving
damages. Thus, the Second Circuit's decision to allow gross
negligence to trigger a presumption of prejudice may increase
spurious spoliation claims.
Moreover, the Second Circuit's decision to weaken the
procedural safeguards against spurious litigation increases the
cost of litigation. More litigants will move for spoliation
sanctions if it is an easier test to satisfy. The increase in motions
for spoliation sanctions will prolong litigation and increase
settlement costs. Both of these expenses cause an even greater
financial burden to be placed on businesses. It will also exact a
burden on the court system itself. By delaying and extending
litigation, the docket of the federal court will become even more
crowded.
Though the Second Circuit's decision allowing gross
negligence to trigger a presumption of prejudice hurts
businesses, it also hurts consumers. In order to stay profitable,
businesses may be forced to shift this increased cost of doing
business onto the consumer.
Thus, while the Second Circuit purports to concern itself
with the financial burdens of electronic discovery, it fails to
adequately assess the financial burdens it imposed as a result of
its decision to allow a presumption of prejudice to be triggered by
the grossly negligent spoliation of information.
C. The Rationales Against a Presumption of Prejudice
Federal courts issue spoliation sanctions under three
rationales: punishment, deterrence, and remediation.152 The test
used to effectuate these rationales focuses on the duty of the
spoliating party to preserve information, the mens rea of the
150 See Rimkus Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598, 616
(S.D. Tex. 2010).
151 Id.
152 See supra Part I.C and accompanying notes.
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spoliating party, and the injury caused by the spoliating party.'13
The third element of the test, the presence of injury, is vital to
each of the rationales for the spoliation doctrine. 15 4
The concept of punishment is forged in the belief that a party
should be punished for its wrongdoing because it deserves to
suffer as a result of its wrongdoing."'5 Moreover, the severity of
punishment should correspond with the level of wrongdoing: A
party whose actions are less egregious should be punished with
less severity than a party whose actions are more egregious.5 6
Generally, courts use two instruments to measure the level
of a party's wrongdoing: the mens rea of the party and the
damage done by the party's wrongful act. 15  The mens rea
measures the intent of the party to commit the harm arising from
his actions and the damage measurement looks to the result of
the wrongful party's actions."'
Though the mens rea and damage measurements provide
independent means for quantifying the level of wrongdoing, and
thus the severity of punishment, the two measurements also
inform one another.' Take, for example, wrongdoers A and B:
A forcibly takes one hundred dollars from V1's person. After A
takes one hundred dollars, she takes out a knife in order to harm
V1. In a completely separate incident, B forcibly takes one
hundred dollars from V2. After B takes the one hundred dollars,
she slips. A knife falls out of B's pocket and heads towards V2.
This is where our information ends. We do not know if V1 and
V2 are injured by A and B's respective acts, nor do we know to
what extent V1 and V2 are injured. Given this lack of
a' See supra Part I.B.
"4 See supra Part I.C.
15 See Adam J. Kolber, The Subjective Experience of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L.
REV. 182, 183 (2009) (discussing the retributive justification of punishment).
11 See id. at 183 ("[A]n offender's suffering should be proportional to the
seriousness of his offense. Hence, murderers should be punished more than
thieves .. ).
1 See supra Part I.B-C.
158 See Sanford H. Kadish, Fifty Years of Criminal Law: An Opinionated Review,
87 CALIF. L. REV. 943, 952 (1999) (discussing the concept of mens rea).
1 Cf Bashir v. Amtrak, 119 F.3d 929, 931 (11th Cir. 1997) (discussing why the
mens rea of a spoliater is useful in determining the prejudicial nature of the
information that was destroyed by the spoliating party); Vick v. Tex. Emp't Comm'n,
514 F.2d 734, 737 (5th Cir. 1975) (citation omitted) ("The adverse inference to be
drawn from destruction of records is predicated on bad conduct of the defendant.
'Moreover, the circumstances of the act must manifest bad faith. Mere negligence is
not enough, for it does not sustain an inference of consciousness of a weak case.' ").
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information, we may still assume that V1 suffered more harm
than V2. 160 This assumption is informed by A and B's respective
mens rea.161  A's punishment will be more severe than B's
because of A's mens rea and the harm we assume A caused. 16 2
Specifically, we may infer that A caused more harm than B did
because A's mens rea was more severe. Such an inference is
predicated on the assumption that those who intend to cause
harm generally cause more harm than those who negligently
cause harm. Thus, the measurement of harm, and the
subsequent severity of punishment is informed by the mens
rea.163  But if A and B suffer the same punishment, the
punishment's failure to distinguish between A and B's level of
wrongdoing is twofold: The punishment not only ignores the
mens rea measurement but also ignores the damage
measurement.
When courts levy sanctions against a spoliating party in
order to punish that party, the severity of the punishment should
correspond with the level of wrongdoing." Since the level of
wrongdoing is measured by the mens rea of the spoliating party
and the damage inflicted by the spoliating party, the severity of
the punishment is a reflection of both measurements. If a federal
court ignores one or both of these elements when determining the
severity of the sanction, it fails to effectuate the punishment
rationale: It fails to distinguish the more egregious act from the
lesser and decides to punish both actions with the same
punishment.
Take, for example, spoliators, X and Y: The prejudicial
nature of the evidence that A and B respectively destroyed
cannot be determined. But the court knows that X's spoliation of
evidence was in bad faith. The court also knows that Y's
spoliation was grossly negligent. If the court issues the same
sanctions against X and Y, its failure to properly calibrate the
punishment is twofold: It fails to adjust the severity of the
sanction based on the respective mens rea of X and Y, and it fails
to adjust the severity of the sanctions based upon the respective
damage done by X and Y.




164 See Kolber, supra note 155, at 183.
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Courts that allow gross negligence to trigger a presumption
of prejudice when determining spoliation sanctions have failed to
limit the severity of sanctions that may be issued.' This failure
runs contra to the principle of the punitive rationale: It fails to
quantify the severity of the sanction with the mens rea and the
damage measurements. To state it more succinctly, grossly
negligent spoliation should not be punished with the same
severity that intentional spoliation is punished when the
prejudicial nature of the spoliation is unknown and can only be
inferred.
The Supreme Court's second rationale for issuing spoliation
sanctions is based upon deterrence. 6 6 Courts operating under
the deterrent rationale assume that would-be spoliators will
decide not to destroy information if they know there is a
possibility that their destruction will occasion sanctions.67 Thus,
a party who wants to destroy information to deprive an opposing
party of that information will be deterred from doing so.168
Similarly, courts operating under the deterrent rationale assume
that parties who have a duty to preserve electronic information
will be more careful in satisfying their duty to preserve
information. 6 9  Thus, a party who might be inclined to act
negligently in its preservation duties will be deterred from doing
SO.
The Second Circuit's decision to allow gross negligence to
trigger a presumption of prejudice certainly deters the grossly
negligent spoliation. Commercial entities have undoubtedly
reacted to the Second Circuit's decision by instituting
sophisticated document retention programs that decrease the
likelihood of grossly negligent spoliation sanctions. At the same
time, mistakes will almost certainly happen. The amount of ESI
being produced is growing at a breakneck pace. 170 As the amount
"' See, e.g., Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of
Am. Sec., LLC, 685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 470, 496-97 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (declining to limit
the severity of spoliation sanctions when a court levies such sanctions based upon a
presumption of prejudice stemming from the gross negligence of the spoliating
party), abrogated by Chin v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 685 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2012).





170 See Catherine A. Casey & Alejandra P. Perez, The Rising Tide of Nonlinear
Review; Disruptive Technology, Savvy Clients and Cost Pressures are Changing the
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of ESI grows, the chance that grossly negligent spoliation will
occur also increases. Though large commercial entities may be
able to keep up with the document retention demands that arise
as a result of the increase in ESI, smaller enterprises will have a
harder time keeping pace due to their fiscal constraints. Thus,
while the Second Circuit's decision to allow gross spoliation to
trigger a presumption of prejudice certainly acts to deter bad
behavior, it does so by setting an impractical standard that will
act to harm litigants more then it helps them. Though the
Second Circuit's attempt to curb spoliation is admirable, it
effectuates an unreasonable standard of care.
Courts' third rationale for issuing sanctions is based upon
the remedial nature of sanctions. The remedial rationale acts to
restore the injured party to "the same position he would have
been in absent the wrongful destruction of evidence by
the ... [spoliating] party."'' The remedial rationale focuses on
the third element of the spoliation test-prejudice. 7 2
Although the remedial rationale for sanctions focuses on
prejudice, the mens rea of the spoliating party may still be
relevant when quantifying the prejudice suffered as a result of
the spoliating party's actions.' 3 A court can infer the prejudicial
nature of evidence if the evidence was destroyed in bad faith. 74
A party would have no reason to deprive the opposing party of
evidence if that evidence was not prejudicial to the spoliating
party.'75
Even though the mens rea of the spoliating party can be
useful in qualifying the prejudicial nature of the spoliated
information, it is not always useful. When a party acts
negligently, "a court cannot logically infer the intent of what a
party did from its behavior because its behavior was
unthinking. ... "176
E-discovery Game; E-Discovery, NAT'L L.J. (2012) ("ESI has been doubling or tripling
every 18 to 24 months.").
1I Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126 (2d Cir. 1998).
172 See id.
17s See D'Onofrio v. SFX Sports Grp., Inc., No. 06-687 (JDB/JMF), 2010 WL






If a court is willing to presume the prejudicial nature of
information based on the fact that the information was destroyed
in a grossly negligent matter, the court necessarily predicates its
presumption on a coin toss: When information is destroyed
negligently, the information is just as likely to be prejudicial as it
is to be beneficial. The court is in effect engaging in a fifty-fifty
proposition.
Furthermore, if a court presumes the prejudicial nature of
evidence based upon gross negligence, the court may provide a
windfall to the non-spoliating party: A party who successfully
moves for spoliation sanctions, but has not suffered harm from
the spoliation, may receive a tactical advantage as a result of the
sanction. The possibility that the party moving for spoliation
sanctions will reap a windfall changes the effect of the sanction.
Instead of curing the injured party, the spoliation sanction may
provide an added benefit to the non-spoliating party.
D. Solving the Problem
"It has long been understood that '[clertain implied powers
must necessarily result to our [ciourts of justice from the nature
of their institution,' powers 'which cannot be dispensed with in a
[clourt, because they are necessary to the exercise of all
others.' "1 Courts' ability to levy spoliation sanctions is
undoubtedly one such power, a power whose absence would
result in the destruction of the discovery process. Yet, while the
power to issue spoliation sanctions is necessary for the just
adjudication of claims, it must be wielded with care, less a shield
be turned to a sword. As Part III illustrates, the decision to allow
grossly negligent spoliation to trigger a presumption of prejudice
weaponizes the procedural armor offered by spoliation sanctions.
In the name of safeguarding the discovery process, the Second
Circuit has adopted a standard that is ambiguously stated and
poorly defined, that imposes overly onerous burdens on litigants
and the court, and that runs contra to the three rationales for
issuing spoliation sanctions. In order to correct the Second
Circuit's error, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure must be
amended to bar the grossly negligent spoliation of evidence from
triggering a presumption of prejudice.
117 Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) (quoting United States v.
Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812)).
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While the Second Circuit is the only circuit that allows gross
negligence of the spoliating party to trigger a presumption of
prejudice,"7 the effect of its holding is felt on a national level.
The Second Circuit's holding makes it easier to successfully move
for spoliation sanctions. A disproportionate amount of litigants
will consequently choose to bring suit in the Second Circuit
because of the lax standard for granting spoliation sanctions.
The result of such forum shopping will increase compliance costs
for national or even regional companies who have to invest in
costly, overly burdensome ESI systems in reaction to the Second
Circuit's decision.
Though there has been some dispute within the Second
Circuit concerning the propriety of its decision to allow gross
negligence to trigger a presumption of prejudice,179 the decision is
unlikely to change. Without a judicial change of heart, the only
way to correct the Second Circuit's error and ensure the just
adjudication of claims is by amending the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
This Note proposes that Rule 37(e) should be amended as
follows: Absent exceptional circumstances, a court may not
impose sanctions under these rules on a party (1) for failing to
provide electronically stored information lost as a result of the
routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information system
and (2) unless the spoliated evidence was shown to be prejudicial,
or was presumed to be prejudicial from a showing of bad faith or
intentional destruction of electronically stored information. 80
The effect of such an amendment would still allow circuit
courts the same level of flexibility in interpreting the good faith
requirement of Rule 37(e)."8' Thus, the amended Rule does not
conflict with the Judicial Conference's stance on not having a
bright-line rule for the spoliation test's mens rea requirement.18 2
This amended Rule 37(e) gives courts a wide degree of
latitude in fashioning appropriate spoliation sanctions, which in
turn preserves the courts' ability to craft spoliation sanctions on
178 See supra Part II.
179 See Orbit One Commc'ns, Inc. v. Numerex Corp., 271 F.R.D. 429, 440
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (discussing how a litigant's failure to show that spoliated
information was prejudicial should not result in sanctions).
18 Rule 37(e)(1) of my proposed revision to Rule 37(e) is the same text as that
currently found in the rule. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e).
181 See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
182 See supra notes 24-26.
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a case-by-case basis. At the same time, the amended Rule
restricts courts' ability to trigger a presumption of prejudice on a
showing of gross negligence. This limitation eliminates the
definitional problems implicit in allowing courts to presume
prejudice on a showing of gross negligence. Simply put, the
amended Rule impinges on judicial discretion only to the degree
necessary to ensure the fair judicial administration of spoliation
sanctions and avoids the misapplication of judicial remedies
proliferated by the Second Circuit's erroneous standard.
Furthermore, amended Rule 37(e) allows federal courts to
use a rebuttable presumption of prejudice if the spoliation is
intentional or done in bad faith. Thus, federal courts can ease
the onerous burden of proving prejudice by utilizing the
rebuttable presumption. At the same time, the amended Rule
bars courts from imposing an overly onerous preservation duty
on commercial entities.
This amended Rule 37(e) also serves the three rationales
inherent in the doctrine of spoliation. The amended Rule
punishes spoliators based upon their culpability and the harm
caused as a result of their spoliation. The amended Rule deters
spoliation by imposing serious penalties on spoliating parties
who act with intent or bad faith, while also realizing that it is an
exercise in futility to deter honest mistakes. Finally, the
amended Rule satisfies the remedial purpose of spoliation
sanctions by providing litigants with the means to cure harm
suffered as a result of spoliation through the retention of the
rebuttable presumption when the spoliator destroyed evidence
with the requisite intent.
While amended Rule 37(e) stops federal courts from allowing
gross negligence to trigger a presumption of prejudice when
issuing spoliation sanctions, its adverse impact on federal
procedure is minute: The only circuit affected by the amended
Rule is the Second Circuit, because it is the only circuit which
currently allows gross negligence to trigger a presumption of
prejudice.'8 3 Thus, the amended Rule would only have the
detrimental effect of unsettling litigants' expectations in a single
circuit. At the same time, the amended Rule ensures that the
Second Circuit's deleterious practice does not spread to other
circuits.
'" See supra Part II.C.
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CONCLUSION
Courts should not use the gross negligence of a spoliating
party to presume that the destroyed evidence would have been
prejudicial to the spoliating party if not for its destruction. Such
a rule runs contra to the rationales for issuing sanctions under
the doctrine of spoliation, increases litigation costs, poses
problems of judicial administrability, and encourages forum
shopping. And perhaps even more importantly, such a rule
ignores the changing realities of our technological capacity. As
the amount of ESI continues to increase at exponential rates, the
burden imposed by the Second Circuit's holding will grow both in
weight and force. In order to stop courts from using such a rule,
Rule 37(e) should be amended to ensure that spoliation sanctions
continue to shield those harmed by the destruction of evidence
and are not used as a procedural sword to attack an innocent
party.
